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1 Introduction
Legislative control over unfair contract terms is regarded in many
countries as an essential tool in the law’s response to the abuses attendant
upon the use of non-negotiated or standard contract terms.1 Some
countries go further and extend statutory fairness control to negotiated
terms.2 The need for unfair contract terms legislation has also repeatedly
been pointed out in South Africa,3 including by a few judges4 and the
* I am grateful to the Oxford Institute of European and Comparative Law, particularly its Director,
Stefan Vogenauer, for hosting me as a visiting fellow in Oxford where this research was done. I also
benefited from financial assistance by the National Research Foundation, the Harry Crossley Fund
and the International Office of the University of Stellenbosch.
1 Such legislation has long been the norm in Europe. See, eg, the German Standard Contract Terms Act
of 1978 (AGBG) now incorporated into the Civil Code (BGB) (} 305 et seq) and the Swedish Consumer
Contract Terms Act of 1994, which replaced an Act from 1971 of the same title. See also the EC
Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 (the Unfair Terms
Directive), and reports on its implementation collated in 1995 European Review of Private Law. Other
countries with such legislation include Zimbabwe, many South American countries, Asian countries
like Japan, Hong Kong and Thailand, Israel, and provinces in Australia and Canada (many of these are
mentioned in the South African Law Commission’s Report on Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts
and the Rectification of Contracts Project 47 April 1998). By standard terms I mean previously
formulated terms intended for repeated and general use. Non-negotiated terms, as the term is used in
Europe, is a wider concept between standard terms and individually negotiated terms. It refers, in the
words of the Directive, to a term drafted in advance, where the consumer has not been able to influence
the substance of the term, particularly in the context of a pre-formulated standard contract. Non-
negotiated terms therefore includes terms pre-formulated for a specific contract, but the Directive
excludes a review of the core terms as to price and subject matter insofar as these are transparent. See
also, eg, Micklitz German Unfair Contract Terms Act and the EC Directive 93/13 in Lonbay (ed)
Enhancing the Legal Position of the European Consumer (1996) 173 180.
2 The Nordic countries provide examples (see Wilhelmsson Standard Form Conditions in Hartkamp et al
Towards a European Civil Code (2004) 431 441). See also the English Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977
which is not limited to standard terms, although its scope is more limited than the title suggests.
3 See, eg, Turpin ‘‘Contract and Imposed Terms’’ 1956 SALJ 144; Aronstam Consumer Protection,
Freedom of Contract and the Law (1979); Ko¨tz ‘‘Controlling Unfair Contract Terms: Options for
Legislative Reform’’ 1986 SALJ 405; Van der Walt ‘‘Die Huidige Posisie van die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg
met betrekking tot Onbillike Kontraksbedinge’’ 1986 SALJ 647; Eiselen ‘‘Die Standaardbedingpro-
bleem: Ekonomiese Magsmisbruik, Verbruikersvraagstuk of Probleem in Eie Reg?’’ 1988 De Jure 251,
1989 De Jure 44; Eiselen Die Beheer oor Standaardbedinge: ’n Regsvergelykende OndersoekUnpublished
LLD dissertation, University of Potchefstroom (1988); Van der Walt ‘‘Kontrakte en Beheer oor
Kontrakvryheid in ’n Nuwe Suid-Afrika’’ 1991 THRHR 367; Van der Walt ‘‘Aangepaste Voorstelle vir
’n Stelsel van Voorkomende Beheer oor Kontrakteervryheid in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg’’ 1993
THRHR 65; Lewis ‘‘Fairness in South African Contract Law’’ 2003 SALJ 330; cf Kerr The Principles
of the Law of Contract 6 ed (2002) 661.
4 Western Bank Ltd v Sparta Construction Co 1975 1 SA 839 (W) 840 and Linstom v Venter 1957 1 SA 125
(SWA), cited by Aronstam Consumer Protection 16 24.
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Law Commission in their 1998 Report on Unreasonable Stipulations of
Contracts and the Rectification of Contracts.5
Subsequent to that Report, some South African writers have still
suggested that common law mechanisms for controlling one-sided terms
(such as interpretation and the requirement of legality)6 may be flexible
enough to deal sufficiently with the problem.7 In addition, some writers
commenting on the Supreme Court of Appeal’s subsequent failure to
strike down a clearly unfair exemption clause in a private hospital
admission form,8 have tended to plead only for a greater role for
constitutional values and common law principles and control mechan-
isms, without calling for general unfair terms legislation.9 This may
perhaps suggest some confidence in the common law and the Bill of
Rights on their own.10
In my view, common law mechanisms and judicial control cannot
sufficiently address the problems in this area, regardless of how wide
judges would be prepared to interpret their powers under the Constitu-
tion or the common law.11 Legislative control in the form of unfair
contract terms legislation (which inter alia gives a general power to courts
to strike out or amend unfair terms) is necessary. South Africa already
has some sector-specific legislation that imposes a measure of control
over the contents of certain contract types, such as the National Credit
Act12 and the Rental Housing Act,13 but these are insufficient to address
the problem of unfair contract terms, which is more pervasive.14
The South African Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) has
therefore taken a step in the right direction by including provisions on
unfair terms control in their proposed Consumer Protection legislation
(which has not yet been finalised).15 Thus South Africa will probably
5 See n 1 supra. This report was effectively shelved after publication.
6 The requirement of legality implies that contracts may not be enforced insofar as they are contrary to
public policy. The most important case is Sasfin v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A).
7 Hefer ‘‘Billikheid in die Kontraktereg volgens die Suid-Afrikaanse Regskommissie’’ 2000 TSAR 142;
Hopkins ‘‘Standard-form Contracts and the Evolving Idea of Private Law Justice: A Case of
Democratic Capitalist Justice Versus Natural Justice’’ 2003 TSAR 150; Hefer ‘‘Billikheid in die
Kontraktereg’’ 2004 Tydskrif vir Regswetenskap 1. Cf Jamneck ‘‘Die Konsepwetsontwerp op die Beheer
van Kontraksbedinge’’ 1997 TSAR 637.
8 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA). The clause excluding liability for bodily injury
caused by negligence was held to be neither surprising nor contrary to public policy.
9 Eg, Tladi ‘‘Breathing Constitutional Values into the Law of Contract: Freedom of Contract and the
Constitution’’ 2002 De Jure 306; Hawthorne ‘‘Closing of the Open Norms in the Law of Contract’’
2004 THRHR 294; but cf Hawthorne ‘‘Distribution of Wealth, the Dependency Theory and the Law of
Contract’’ 2006 THRHR 48. Cf Bhana & Pieterse ‘‘Towards a Reconciliation of Contract Law and
Constitutional Values: Brisley and Afrox Revisited’’ 2005 SALJ 865 who, in criticising the Afrox case,
argue in depth for a greater role for constitutional values in applying common law rules such as those
on illegality, but mention in a footnote that they do not wish to state a preference for legislative
enactment or judicial reform to facilitate constitutional compliance of contract law.
10 Such writers may, however, have simply focused on common law and constitutional arguments
because these are already available.
11 As will be explained further below.
12 34 of 2005.
13 50 of 1999.
14 Such legislation is bound to have lacunae in respect of unfair terms control (Ko¨tz 1986 SALJ 405 409).
15 Draft Consumer Protection Bill, 2006, published for comment in GN 418 in GG 28629 of 2006-03-15.
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soon have unfair terms legislation which allows the ‘‘striking out’’ of
unfair terms across different types of contract.
A proper understanding of the reasons why legislative control are
required, and thus the types of goals it should achieve, remains
important, however, even when we accept that such legislation is now
inevitable. Such reasons will be analysed below, an exercise which is
certainly not aimed primarily at persuading sceptics that we cannot do
without unfair contract terms legislation. More importantly, a clear
understanding of the mischief which such legislation should address, and
of the reasons for the insufficiency of judicial control, is a prerequisite for
a proper evaluation of the content of such legislation, in other words, for
arguments on the appropriateness and effectiveness of particular
legislative choices or techniques.16 Such an understanding also has a
bearing on the proper interpretation and application of whatever
provisions will be included in the legislation in the end.
In my view, therefore, to properly assess legislative techniques and the
scope of unfair terms legislation, it is not sufficient merely to proceed
from a comparative overview of experiences elsewhere, and some
practical arguments why one approach or choice may be more attractive
than another, without a proper understanding of the problems which
such legislation seeks to address and the resultant methodological choices
which this points to.17
This article therefore focuses on the implications of the problems faced
by consumers confronted with non-negotiated terms, including the
inherent limitations of judicial control, for the contents of unfair contract
terms legislation. The purpose of this article is not to investigate
extensively once again all the possible arguments for and against the
concept of unfair contract terms legislation. This has been done
sufficiently before by others in South Africa, and seems unnecessary
given the overwhelming international support for such legislation and the
imminence of the South African legislation. The reason I focus on the
mischief to be addressed and the limits of judicial control is rather that an
understanding of the problems faced by consumers is essential for an
attempt to address them as effectively as possible when drafting and
applying the legislation.
Therefore, in paragraph 2 below, I will first give an overview of the
problems posed by the use of non-negotiated contract terms especially, as
these problems and their methodological implications are sometimes not
properly understood. From this analysis some conclusions will be drawn
on the appropriate formulation and interpretation of unfair terms
legislation. In this regard, I will point out some dangers to be avoided
when formulating, interpreting and applying typical unfair terms
provisions. Paragraph 3 will set out the reasons why judicial control
16 Cf also Eiselen 1988 De Jure 251.
17 Wilhelmsson Standard Form Conditions 432-433; cf Eiselen 1988 De Jure 251.
UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS LEGISLATION 363
generally is insufficient to deal with the problem on its own. This analysis
will be applied to reach conclusions on some other broad choices to be
made in formulating and applying unfair terms legislation. I will illustrate
the practical implications of these choices in respect of some particular
legislative techniques.
A full consideration of all the major methodological choices raised by
the prospect of unfair terms legislation can obviously not be attempted in
one article. An analysis of the abuses attendant upon the use of unfair
contract terms, and what such legislation generally seeks to achieve in
this regard, is not the only determinant of good policy. For example,
although one reason why control is justified over non-negotiated terms is
also often present in business-to-business contracts (B2B contracts), the
appropriate scope and form of control over B2B contracts is a complex
issue, due to various other policy considerations at play. It therefore
rather deserves a separate comprehensive study. Another controversy
which will not be addressed here is the degree to which unfair terms
legislation should also allow the striking out of negotiated terms. There
are certainly some policy reasons for extending legislative control to
negotiated terms in business-to-consumer contracts (B2C contracts),18
but this is a somewhat complex question which I cannot properly address
here.19 I therefore do not, in this article, attempt to draw comprehensive
conclusions on the correct methodological or theoretical paradigm(s) for
unfair terms legislation in order to comment on these and all other
fundamental choices on the scope of such statutory control. Nevertheless,
I consider that the few choices that are commented upon are important to
evaluate and improve the formulation and eventual application of unfair
terms legislation. I also realise that more comprehensive, comparative
research on some particular practical techniques mentioned by me will be
beneficial to a more detailed proposal on their use, especially insofar as
they were not considered fully by the South African Law Commission.20
This article focuses primarily on ‘‘content control’’ in general unfair
terms legislative provisions.Usually there aremore steps than that involved
in the control of unfair terms.21 The first step involves incorporation
control. This entails, for example, the common law rule that surprising
clauses should be pointed out before they could formpart of the contract, as
18 I do not include business-to-small-business contracts where the small business deals within its normal
contractual sphere of competence when I speak of consumer contracts. The DTI proposals make no
differentiation between such contracts and consumer contracts in a more traditional sense. Small
businesses are always regarded as consumers for purposes of the Act, except in the case of certain high-
value transactions.
19 All the provisions in the SA Law Commission’s proposed Bill, as well as those of the DTI’s draft Bill
apply without differentiation to negotiated and non-negotiated terms, with the obvious intention that
courts may draw the necessary differentiation on the facts of a particular case.
20 The DTI’s new proposals deviate from the Law Commission’s proposed Bill of 1998 in a number of
respects. No explanatory memorandum or similar document was published to explain the choices
made in the DTI draft Bill.
21 See also Bernitz European Law in Sweden Its Implementation and Role in Market and Consumer Law
(2002) 246.
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well as formalities requirements, such as the new provisions proposed by
the DTI which require express agreement on exemption and limitation of
liability clauses, evidenced by signature next to such terms.22 I will only
make some remarks on possible dangers of the last mentioned legislative
technique. Secondly, rules of interpretation, especially the contra profer-
entem rule, play a role. Thirdly, othermandatory legislationmust be kept in
mind. This type of control may consist of ‘‘adding’’ mandatory implied
terms to a contract type. If this is not relevant to a particular term, the
content control of the unfair contract terms legislation comes into play. The
first step in this part of the adjudication process would typically be
considering any prohibited list of terms, and thereafter the general clause
together with the provisions which seek to give guidance on its application.
There is some link between incorporation control and content control
in general unfair terms legislation, however. The suspicion that there is
typically not enough justification for incorporation of unfair non-
negotiated terms other than core terms, justifies overt content control.23
This is because an examination of what typically happens in the context
of non-negotiated terms (attempted below), suggests that the average
consumer often creates no reasonable reliance that he would agree to
unfair terms in the fine print. Instead, the user of the terms more likely
creates a reasonable reliance by the signals it sends out through
marketing etcetera that contracting with it would be a pleasurable
experience, that the customer will be treated fairly and that the business
would not seek to avoid liability.24
As the proposed Consumer Protection legislation is far from finalised
at the time of writing (and hopefully will still be subject to thorough
debate and improvement for some time), no overview of the proposals
thus far will be provided, but some of the draft provisions will be referred
to to illustrate certain arguments.
2 The justification for intervention, and the resultant need for
‘‘content control’’, including ‘‘substantive unfairness control’’
2 1 The reasons and justification for intervention
The non-negotiated or standard terms of a B2C contract can often not be
regarded as ‘‘the proper expression of the self-determination of both
parties’’, which ultimately is the justification for enforcement of
22 S 50.
23 TheUKLawCommissions state in theirConsultationPaper that onemustaccept that defects in theprocess
of conclusion of such contracts are inevitable so that the substance of such contracts must be controlled
overtly (Law Commission & Scottish Law Commission Unfair Contract Terms a Joint Consultation
Paper 7, Law Commission Consultation Paper No 166, Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper No
119) (hereafter UK Law Commissions Consultation Paper).
24 Willett Good Faith and Consumer Contract Terms in Brownsword, Hird & Howells (eds) Good Faith in
Contract: Concept and Context (1999) 67 76-77. Cf also Aronstam Consumer Protection 16; Eiselen
1988 De Jure 255.
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agreements, under the banner of ‘‘party autonomy’’ and ‘‘freedom of
contract’’.25 To use a phrase of Reinhard Zimmermann,26 the reality is
that, for whatever reason, a ‘‘proper evaluation and balancing of [all] the
consequences of the transaction does not normally occur’’ on the side of
one of the parties to a standard term contract. The typical absence of this
basic justification for enforcement of contracts in itself demands the
exercise of control over the contract’s contents in the interests of party
autonomy and social responsibility.27 These goals of contract law are
furthermore bolstered by the fundamental constitutional values of
freedom, equality and dignity.28 Autonomy (and thus ‘‘freedom’’) is in
fact not guaranteed where one party effectively claims freedom of
contract for it alone, whereas there is only freedom of contract for the
other party in a very formalistic, hollow and practically meaningless
sense.29 It has therefore quite rightly been said that statutory intervention
is necessary to protect freedom of contract.30
A proper understanding of the reasonswhy the autonomyof the customer
is impaired is important to ensure the effectiveness of any intervention.
It appears that the most important reason why the customer has no
chance of influencing the non-negotiated terms is the ‘‘prohibitively high
transaction costs involved, rather than the superiority of the entrepre-
neur’’.31 Indeed, very often the main reason why consumers and
25 The first quoted phrase is that of Zimmermann The New German Law of Obligations (2005) 206. See
also Eiselen 1988 De Jure 257-258; Wilhelmsson Standard Form Conditions 432.
26 New German Law of Obligations 206 208. See also Sandrock ‘‘The Standard Terms Act 1976 of West
Germany’’ 1978 American Journal of Comparative Law 551; Maxeiner ‘‘Standard-Terms Contracting
in the Global Electronic Age: European Alternatives’’ 2003 Yale Journal of International Law 109 174.
27 See the authorities in the previous footnote and Turpin 1956 SALJ 144 145.
28 Autonomy clearly equates with freedom and equality and dignity is endangered if the law allows the
user of standard terms to pursue its own interests without a reasonable measure of concern for those of
its contractual partner, especially where the latter’s apparent assent to unreasonably detrimental terms
is not in fact an expression of his self-determination.
29 Rakoff ‘‘Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction’’ 1983 Harvard Law Review 1173 1236;
Bassenge et al Palandt Bu¨rgerliches Gesetzbuch 63 ed (2004) U¨berblick v } 305 Rdn 8; Zimmermann
New German Law of Obligations 207-208, Howells & Weatherill Consumer Protection Law 2 ed (2005)
18; Van der Walt 1993 THRHR 65 67; Eiselen 1988 De Jure 256; cf BVerfGE 89, 214 et seq. Lord
Reid’s recognition of a lack of real freedom of contract in Suisse Atlantique v Rotterdamsche Kolen
Centrale 1966 2 All ER 69 76 is often cited: ‘‘In the ordinary way, the customer has no time to read [the
standard terms], and, if he did read them, he would probably not understand them. If he did
understand and object to any of them, he would generally be told that he could take it or leave it. If he
then went to another supplier, the result would be the same. Freedom to contract must surely imply
some choice or room for bargaining.’’
30 Hondius Standaardvoorwaarden (1978) 341; Maxeiner 2003 Yale Journal of International Law 109 174;
WilhelmssonStandardFormConditions 432;Lewis 2003SALJ 330 348; and thewriters cited in n 29 supra.
31 Zweigert & Ko¨tz Comparative Law 335; Zimmermann New German Law of Obligations 176; Rebmann,
Sa¨cker & Rixecker Mu¨nchener Kommentar zum Bu¨rgerlichen Gesetzbuch Band 2a Schuldrecht
Allgemeiner Teil 4 ed (2003) Vorbemerkum zum } 305 Rn 5. See also the writers cited in the following
footnotes. For an example of a recent contrary argument that it is primarily a lack of bargaining
power that justifies intervention, see Hopkins 2003 TSAR 150 154-155 and cf Bhana & Pieterse 2005
SALJ 865 884. It has been pointed out in the UK that ‘‘inequality of bargaining power’’ is an
ambiguous concept anyway, which decreases its helpfulness in this area (Beale ‘‘Inequality of
Bargaining Power’’ 1986 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 123 125; The Law Commission of England
and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission Unfair Terms in Contracts Report on a Reference
under Section 3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 1965 (Law Commission Consultation Paper No
292, Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper No 199) 43; UK Law Commissions’ Consultation
Paper par 4.102.
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businesses resign themselves to accept standard terms is that it simply
takes too much time and effort to read long, complex lists of standard
terms every time one enters into a transaction, even for a relatively well-
informed, sophisticated consumer in a competitive market.32 It takes even
more time and effort to think through and find out the implications or
meaning of the standard terms, as will finding someone in the
counterparty-organisation who has the authority to negotiate an
amendment, suggesting alternative terms and bargaining about them,
or shopping around for more favourable standard terms.33 The
transaction costs of doing any of the above are out of proportion to
the dangers apparent to the average customer at conclusion of the
contract.34 There is therefore no easy alternative for the reasonable
person but to submit, even without reading, and to focus only on the core
terms, that is, the terms of immediate concern.35 Without more, this
probably justifies control, as the transaction costs in itself understandably
inhibits a proper evaluation of the consequences of the transaction, which
contradicts the assumption that the agreement resulted from self-
determination by both parties.36
Even the customer who understands that it is important to read the
fine print, will therefore often realise at the same time, or very soon
thereafter, that it will require just too much effort to actually obtain
standard terms which are fairer. Such a customer may therefore
eventually stop his or her practice of reading all the fine print in every
contract. Attempts to negotiate standard terms, even amongst businesses,
are therefore said to be rare.37 (It has been said that any bargaining done
by businesses in this area is usually aimed at acceptance of the whole of
32 Rakoff 1983 Harvard Law Review 1173 1226; Zweigert & Ko¨tz Introduction to Comparative Law 3 ed
(translated by Weir) (1998) 334-335; Howells & Weatherill Consumer Protection Law 19; Griggs ‘‘The
[Ir]rational Consumer and Why We Need National Legislation Governing Unfair Contract Terms’’
2005 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 1 16-17 27-28; Hillman ‘‘Online Boilerplate: Would
Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-Standard Terms Backfire?’’ 2006 Michigan Law Review 837 839-
841. Hillman mentions his empirical study involving contracts students which tends to show that only
about 4% of American shoppers on the internet read standard terms available to them (as opposed to
core terms as to price etc) (839 841-842). Cf Lewis 2003 SALJ 330 339; Thornton v Shoe Land Parking
Ltd 1971 2 QB 163 169.
33 See the authorities in n 32 supra and Zimmermann New German Law of Obligations 176.
34 Rebmann et al Mu¨nchener Kommentar Vorbemerkung zum } 305 Rn 5; Coester, Coester-Waltjen &
Schlosser in Martinek (ed) J von Staudingers Kommentar zum Bu¨rgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit
Einfu¨hrungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen AGBG 13 ed (1998) Einl zum AGBG } 3 ff Rn 4; Maxeiner
2003 Yale Journal of International Law 109 114; Hillman 2006 Michigan Law Review 837 840-841.
35 Maxeiner 2003 Yale Journal of International Law 109 114; Rakoff 1983 Harvard Law Review 1173
1226. See Macneil ‘‘Bureaucracy and Contracts of Adhesion’’ 1984 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 5 6:
‘‘[N]o one can honestly say that consumers ought to read long documents of this kind. The many
courts which over the years have casually or not so casually said that ignore the fact that if consumers
actually did such a foolish thing the modern economy would come to a screeching halt.’’ This may be
overstating the case somewhat. Core terms would concern, for example, the price and any warranty
period.
36 See the quotations from Zimmermann New German Law of Obligations 206.
37 Coester et al Staudinger Einl zum AGBG } 3 ff Rn 4.
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the one or the other party’s terms, which is a less costly alternative to
studying and haggling over individual terms).38
Additional psychological factors are likely to dissuade customers,
particularly unsophisticated consumers, from bargaining.39 The standard
form may appear official and invariable, for example.40 Companies also
generally send out signals in advertising and the like that contracting with
them would only be a positive experience, and a customer is therefore
lulled into a sense of security that he will always be treated fairly.41 Even
the sophisticated, more suspicious customer with time to read and
bargain will often not wish to be seen as the one eccentric and difficult
individual who haggles over terms which apparently only apply in
exceptional circumstances and which all other customers are prepared to
‘‘accept’’ without more. This applies especially to consumer contracting
which often takes place in a public space.
In addition, such an eccentric customer is unlikely to find better
alternatives or a different attitude to the normal ‘‘take-it-or-leave-it’’ one
elsewhere. Even a marketplace which is competitive on the core terms
does not usually ensure that fair standard terms or ‘‘fine print’’ are also
on offer.42 In fact, it may cause the eccentric consumer to have even less
time to read and shop around for small print, given that more time has to
be spent in comparing the core aspects of the many products on offer.
The incentive for business to offer fair standard terms is therefore not
increased at all. The increased need to remain competitive may perhaps
even encourage businesses to shift more risks onto customers in the small
print in an attempt to drive prices down.43
Moreover, standard term contracts are often sprung on businesses and
consumers at the very last moment when they have already decided to
contract on the basis of the core terms which were disclosed to them from
the start. Sometimes they have already made all sorts of arrangements
which would be difficult to pull out from when confronted with the
standard terms. This is an additional factor which would keep a
consumer from bargaining about these terms. The situation in Afrox
Healthcare Ltd v Strydom44 provides an example. As has already been
pointed out,45 when a patient such as Strydom is confronted with the
38 Coester et al Staudinger Einl zum AGBG } 3 ff Rn 4.
39 Eiselen 1989 De Jure 44 49. Of course, many consumers in South Africa are very vulnerable and not
well-informed about contractual matters at all.
40 Eiselen 1989 De Jure 44 49. Consumers are intimidated from bargaining by all these realities (Howells
& Weatherill Consumer Protection Law 20).
41 Willett Good Faith and Consumer Contract Terms 76-77.
42 Griggs 2005Competition and Consumer Law Journal 1 23; UK Law Commissions Consultation Paper 8.
43 Rakoff 1983 Harvard Law Review 1173 1227; UK Law Commissions Consultation Paper 9; Eiselen
1989 De Jure 44 50; Beale Legislative Control of Fairness: The Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts in Beatson & Friedmann (eds) Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (1995) 231; Beale
‘‘Inequality of Bargaining Power’’ 1986 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 123 131; cf Howells Good
Faith in Consumer Contracting in Brownsword et al (eds) Good Faith in Contract 91 95.
44 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA).
45 Naude´ & Lubbe ‘‘Exemption Clauses A Rethink Occasioned by Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom
2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA)’’ 2005 SALJ 441 461.
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private hospital admission form containing the small print, he has
already booked his bed for that day, and has often agreed to be operated
upon or treated by a specific doctor who only works from that hospital,
and made all the necessary arrangements for leave at work, and so forth.
To pull out of all these arrangements at the last moment and to arrange
alternative treatment elsewhere, due to a confrontation with an
exemption clause is not a realistic option, and his ‘‘bargaining power’’
is definitely drastically decreased by his interest to have the treatment as
planned.46 The same applies, for example, when a consumer had already
concluded a contract over the telephone with an adventure sports
company to go river rafting, and when he or she finally arrives at the
destination, perhaps hundreds of kilometres away from home, he or she
is suddenly confronted with the requirement to sign a document first
exempting the company from liability for bodily injury caused by
negligence before he or she can continue with the holiday.
Often, the users of standard terms effectively ‘‘trade’’ or ‘‘speculate’’ on
the customer’s typical lack of knowledge, experience, time, bargaining
skill, choice and/or assertiveness to include onerous terms, which
maximize only the interests of the user.47 There is simply very little
incentive to do otherwise.
It is therefore important to note that there is a problem of typical
insufficient evaluation of the consequences of the transaction by one
party, regardless of that party’s bargaining strength in the light of other
sources of supply, his sophistication, and theoretical opportunities for
shopping around and negotiation.48 The realities of the marketplace for
consumers and many businesses make it normal to enter into contracts
without reading the standard terms, or at least, without bargaining about
them.
Because of the resultant one-sided imposition of standard terms, the
user of the standard terms acts more like a legislator than a contracting
party.49 Thus, just as controls in favour of the public are necessary over
legislation emanating from government departments, control in favour of
the public over this type of ‘‘private legislation’’ is justified.
46 Naude´ & Lubbe 2005 SALJ 441 461. Theoretically, of course, the other options are open to him. This
is implicit in the Supreme Court of Appeal’s argument that there was no evidence that the patient was
in a weaker bargaining position (par 12). In fact, the Medi-Clinic private hospital group had no
exemption clause relating to death or bodily injury in their admission forms at that stage. This
illustrates the ambiguity of the concept of inequality of bargaining power and the problem of
uncritically considering the existence of alternative offerings in the market without the particular term.
47 Zweigert & Ko¨tz Comparative Law 331 336; Ko¨tz 1986 SALJ 405 410; Maxeiner 2003 Yale Journal of
International Law 109 143. Cf Bassenge et al Palandt U¨berblick v } 305 Rdn 6.
48 Cf also Eiselen 1988 De Jure 251.
49 Kessler ‘‘Contracts of Adhesion Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract’’ 1943 Columbia Law
Review 629 640; Rakoff 1983 Harvard Law Review 1173 1237; Maxeiner 2003 Yale Journal of
International Law 109 119.
UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS LEGISLATION 369
Perhaps it is not too surprising that it has been questioned whether
there is any justification at all for enforcing such standard terms insofar
as they conflict with the background or residual rules of contract law.50
Clearly, however, the use of standard terms per se is an inevitable
phenomenon in modern business life, particularly in this age of complex
organisational structures and mass marketing.51 It is required, for
example, by the efficient use of expensive managerial and legal talent so
that more lowly-paid, less highly-trained personnel can contract with
clients on a controlled basis.52 The background rules also do not always
provide sufficiently detailed rules for the complexities of modern business
transactions. It has therefore been suggested that it is only the public
interest in economic efficiency created by the standard terms that justifies
the enforcement of non-negotiated standard terms (and not consensus or
reasonable reliance thereof).53 By implication, only standard terms which
are necessary in the public interest should be enforced, and clearly not
unjustifiably onerous and one-sided terms.54 Rakoff argues that
‘‘invisible terms’’ should not be presumptively enforceable. Instead, the
user should prove justification of deviation from the background law on
the basis that enforcement contributes significantly to the maintenance of
civic freedom, as this is ultimately why a firm should be allowed to
organise itself by means of standard terms.55 Thus he is in favour of a
more ‘‘positive’’ approach which requires a business to prove that its
non-core non-negotiated terms are fair and reasonable (whenever they
conflict with background law).56
2 2 The resultant case for content control
The first conclusion to be drawn is that content control is justified, at the
very least in negative form by striking out (or amending) unfair terms. This
is unquestioningly true in respect of non-negotiated terms, due to the
50 Wilhelmsson mentions (but does not advocate) the radical notion that businesses should only be
allowed to supplement non-mandatory or residual rules, and not to change them in their favour in
standard terms (Standard Form Conditions 443). Cf Rakoff 1983 Harvard Law Review 1173 1238.
51 Rakoff 1983 Harvard Law Review 1173 1220-1223. For other claims on the usefulness of standard
terms see, eg, Eiselen 1988 De Jure 254; Hopkins 2003 TSAR 150 153-154; Zweigert & Ko¨tz
Comparative Law 333; Maxeiner 2003 Yale Journal of International Law 109 113; Howells & Weatherill
Consumer Protection Law 19.
52 Rakoff 1983 Harvard Law Review 1173 1223; Beale Legislative Control of Fairness 231-232.
53 Burgess ‘‘Consumer Adhesion Contracts and Unfair Terms: A Critique of Current Theory and a
Suggestion’’ 1986 Anglo-American Law Review 255 271-274. Cf Pretorius ‘‘The Basis of Contractual
Liability (4): Towards a Composite Theory of Contract’’ 2006 THRHR 97: ‘‘The reliance principle has
much to do with ascription of contractual responsibility in circumstances where it is fair and
reasonable to do so.’’
54 Burgess 1986 Anglo-American Law Review 255 271-274.
55 Rakoff 1983 Harvard Law Review 1173 1240-1242. For a recent defence by Rakoff of his views, see
Rakoff ‘‘The Law and Sociology of Boilerplate’’ 2006 Michigan Law Review 1235. See also
Wilhelmsson Standard Form Conditions 443.
56 The UK Law Commissions’ proposed Unfair Contract Terms Bill of 2005 also places the onus on the
business contracting with a consumer (a natural person acting outside his trade or profession) to prove
its non-core terms are reasonable when the issue is raised, whether by the consumer or mero motu by
the court. In South Africa, by contrast, a negative striking-out approach is proposed.
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inherent structural inequality caused by the use of such terms and the
typical and understandable absence of proper evaluation of the con-
sequences of submitting to such terms,57 which inhibit the autonomy of
normal people confronted with standard terms58 and make them
vulnerable to abuse.
This justifies control without more, but such control is furthermore also
in the public interest in a more general sense. Ultimately, the costs incurred
by society are higher if the risks andobligations involved are not shouldered
by the party best able to prevent risks or to bear themmost efficiently from
an economic point of view.59 To shift risks and obligations onto the
structurally weaker party as a matter of course, without an offer of an
alternative deal at a higher price, andmostly without his or her knowledge,
is not necessarily efficient from an economic point of view.60 More
speculative, but perhaps true, are claims that the removal of unfair terms
may increase consumer confidence and trust and therefore economic
activity, and that grievance procedure costs will ultimately be reduced.61
2 3 The possibility of control on the basis of substantive unfairness alone
It should always be possible to impugn non-negotiated terms, which
may be fair if specifically pointed out or agreed to, on the basis of the
particular customer’s lack of bargaining strength and other problems
with the bargaining process itself, such as a lack of alternative terms in
the marketplace and a lack of knowledge of the term. The converse is also
true: a term which would appear to be excessively one-sided and unfair
generally may be justified if the customer consciously decided to contract
on that basis after having considered alternatives. Procedural factors to
do with the manner in which the particular contract was concluded may
indeed be relevant to the question of fairness.
However, the reality that the prohibitively high transaction costs
involved understandably discourage contracting parties to read all the
small print, and the fact that it would be an inefficient use of time and
resources anyway,62 justifies the possibility of regarding terms as unfair
per se, regardless of the circumstances surrounding the manner in which
the agreement was reached (‘‘the procedural factors’’).63
57 See n 26 supra.
58 See par 2 1 supra; cf Vickers ‘‘Economics for Consumer Policy’’ 2004 125 Proceedings of the British
Academy 287 302.
59 Willett Good Faith and Consumer Contract Terms 67.
60 Willett Good Faith and Consumer Contract Terms 67.
61 Griggs 2005 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 1 49-50 and authorities there cited.
62 Howells & Weatherill Consumer Protection Law 261-262; cf Burgess 1986 Anglo-American Law Review
255 270.
63 Eiselen 1989 De Jure 44 45; UK Law Commissions Consultation Paper 7 15 40; Wilhelmsson Standard
Form Conditions 432-433; Griggs 2005 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 1 21; Maxeiner 2003
Yale Journal of International Law 109 119; Atiyah Essays on Contract (1986) 346: ‘‘it is no longer
possible to accept without serious qualification the idea that the law is today solely concerned with the
bargaining process and not with the result’’.
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Legislation should therefore make it possible, in appropriate cases, to
strike out non-negotiated terms simply because they are unfair in content
(‘‘substantively unfair’’), whether or not there were theoretical opportu-
nities to become acquainted with the terms; whether or not the customer
was theoretically free to explore the possibility of negotiation, but did not
do so; whether or not the product could theoretically have been obtained
elsewhere on better standard terms; and whether or not the consumer’s
‘‘bargaining position’’ (an ambiguous term) and ‘‘sophistication’’ was
lower than that of the user of the standard terms.64 That is, ‘‘substantive
unfairness’’ control should be possible, particularly in the case of non-
negotiated terms, which may make an investigation into the procedural
unfairness of the specific case irrelevant.65 For example, courts should be
able to declare a term that unreasonably goes beyond protection of the
legitimate interests of its user and that unreasonably prejudices the
consumer, to be unfair, despite the fact that a competitor happened to
include a fairer term on that point in its standard terms.
For this reason, to include practically only procedural factors in the
five factors to which courts ‘‘must’’ have regard in particular in
determining whether a term is unfair, as the DTI draft Bill does,66 is
problematic and not very helpful.67 It may perhaps give the impression
that mere substantive unfairness in itself is not sufficient. The reality is
that consumers, regardless of how sophisticated they are, will often not
read standard terms as a result of the high transaction costs involved and
are effectively dissuaded from assessing whether there was in fact ‘‘an
opportunity of acquiring the goods or services, or equivalent goods or
services, from any source of supply under a contract that did not include
that term’’,68 one of the few factors listed in the DTI’s draft Bill. A court
which is not sufficiently conscious of the realities of standard form
contracting may therefore consider the mere existence of other offerings
in the marketplace which happen not to include the particular term, as
unduly important in counting against the consumer. As I have shown, the
reality that high transaction costs make even a reading of all the terms on
offer unlikely, applies regardless of ‘‘the bargaining strength of the
parties relative to each other, taking into account (i) the availability of
equivalent goods or services and (ii) suitable alternative sources of
supply’’ (thus economic inequality), one of the few factors which ‘‘must’’
be considered ‘‘in particular’’ according to the proposed legislation.
64 Cf Eiselen 1989 De Jure 44 45 generally.
65 I do not use ‘‘substantive fairness’’ control in the sense used by Collins ‘‘Good Faith in European
Contract Law’’ 1994 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 229 246 as an evaluation of whether the
consumer received poor value for money. This article does not concern the legitimacy of price control,
or ‘‘core terms’’ control.
66 S 58 on ‘‘unfair contract terms’’. I am counting s 58(1)(b) as encompassing two factors. The last factor
is ‘‘in the case of supply of goods, whether the goods were manufactured, processed or adapted to the
special order of the buyer’’. This is the only factor which can be described as substantive, but it is only
relevant in a few cases.
67 See also Maxeiner 2003 Yale Journal of International Law 109 119.
68 S 58(1)(b).
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It appears that the source of inspiration for this list of factors in the
DTI’s draft Bill was the United Kingdom’s Unfair Contract Terms Act of
1977 (the UCTA)69 and perhaps the Preamble70 of the EC Unfair Terms
Directive of 1993,71 which lists similar factors.
This being the case, it is important also to take note of the new list of
relevant factors proposed by the Law Commissions of England, Wales
and Scotland in their Unfair Contract Terms Bill of 2005, which they
recommend should replace the UCTA and the Unfair Terms in
Consumer Contracts Regulations of 1999.72
In the UK Law Commissions’ new list, the procedural factors are
‘‘balanced’’ by more factors relevant to substantive fairness, and some of
the important procedural factors are explained in such a way as to invite
sensitivity to the realities of standard form contracting. The substantive
unfairness factors listed include ‘‘(c) the balance of the parties’ interests,
(d) the risks to the party adversely affected by the term, (e) the possibility
and probability of insurance and (g) the extent to which the term
(whether alone or with others) differs from what would have been the
case in its absence’’.73 The United Kingdom allows publication of
Explanatory Notes with a Bill, and the Law Commissions have used this
technique to explain further what might be relevant when considering the
procedural factors of a party’s ‘‘knowledge and understanding’’ and the
‘‘strength of the parties’ bargaining positions’’, two factors in their list.
After having specifically warned that ‘‘inequality of bargaining power’’ is
an ambiguous term which is often misunderstood,74 the Law Commis-
sions explain in the Notes to the Bill that ‘‘the strength of the parties’
bargaining positions’’ ‘‘may involve questions such as (a) whether the
transaction was unusual for either or both of them, (b) whether the
complaining party was offered a choice over a particular term, (c)
whether that party had a reasonable opportunity to seek a more
favourable term, (d) whether that party had a realistic opportunity to
enter into a similar contract with other persons, but without that term, (e)
whether that party’s requirements could have been met in other ways, (f)
whether it was reasonable, given that party’s abilities, for him or her to
have taken advantage of any choice offered under (b) or available under
(e)’’.75 In considering the ‘‘knowledge and understanding’’ of a party, it
may be relevant ‘‘(c) whether the party understood [the term’s] meaning
and implications, (d) what a person other than the party, but in a similar
position, would usually expect in the case of a similar transaction, (e) the
complexity of the transaction, (f) the information given to the party
69 Schedule 2.
70 Or Recitals.
71 For the Directive’s full title, see n 1 supra.
72 Law Commissions’ Report 60 (s 14(4) of the Bill). The Regulations (UTCCR) were promulgated in
response to the Unfair Terms Directive.
73 S 14(4).
74 43.
75 Par 45 of the Explanatory Notes.
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about the transaction before or when the contract was made, (g) whether
the contract was transparent, (h) how the contract was explained to the
party, (i) whether the party had a reasonable opportunity to absorb any
information given, (j) whether the party took professional advice or it
was reasonable to expect the party to have done so, and (k) whether the
party had a realistic opportunity to cancel the contract without
charge’’.76
The South African Law Commission also included some factors to do
with substantive fairness in their list of guidelines, and it is not clear why
the DTI left these out.77 Such factors include ‘‘(m) whether a term is
unduly difficult to fulfil, or imposes obligations or liabilities on a party
which are not reasonably necessary to protect the other party; (n)
whether the contract or term excludes or limits the obligations or
liabilities of a party to an extent that is not reasonably necessary to
protect his or her interests; (o) whether there is a lack of reciprocity in an
otherwise reciprocal contract; (w) whether, to the prejudice of the party
against whom the term is proffered, the party proffering the term is
otherwise placed in a position substantially better than that in which the
party proffering the term would have been under the regulatory law, had
it not been for the term in question; (x) the degree to which the contract
requires a party to waive rights to which he or she would otherwise be
entitled’’.
A list of factors is in any event more helpful to guide courts, businesses,
consumers and enforcement agencies if it also includes factors relevant to
substantive fairness, which clearly is relevant along with procedural
factors. Factors to do with substantive unfairness will be especially
important in ‘‘abstract proceedings’’ in which an injunction is sought
against a particular business to stop using or to amend a particular term,
mostly at the behest of the National Consumer Commission or a
consumer organisation.78
One therefore hopes that the South African consumer protection
legislation will benefit from the UK Law Commissions’ and SA Law
Commission’s example in this regard, instead of substantially reverting to
the factors initially formulated in the UK in 1977. The UK Law
76 Par 44 of the Explanatory Notes.
77 S 2. As I will suggest later, some of the SA Law Commission’s ‘‘factors’’ are not so much open-ended
factors likely to be relevant in many cases, but concern specific types of clauses, such as clauses on set-
off, which should rather have been considered for inclusion in a ‘‘suspect list’’ or ‘‘grey list’’ of terms
which would normally be unfair, unless the circumstances justify a contrary conclusion. It is
understandable that the DTI did not include these in their list of factors, but neither did they make use
of a ‘‘suspect list’’. See further par 3 3 infra.
78 Unfair terms legislation should always empower an administrative body and consumers’ organisations
to take action against businesses using unfair terms, that is, without a particular consumer as plaintiff
being involved. Such action will often centre on substantive fairness ‘‘in the abstract’’, although the
transparency of the term, which could be regarded as a procedural factor, should also be important. It
should be possible for the court or tribunal to make an order with ‘‘procedural’’ components in such
an action, such as ordering the business to introduce a certain practice, such as expressly pointing out a
particular term or rewriting a term in clearer language or giving more information to consumers (cf s
55(1)(b) of the DTI’s draft Bill).
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Commission’s substantive fairness factors seem to be more succinct than
the ones mentioned from the SA Law Commission’s Bill, but nevertheless
more attention should be given to at least both these sources of lists of
factors.
Regardless of what the list of factors ultimately looks like, courts
should remember that they should be able to find a term unfair in content
without having to find anything unreasonable in the way in which the
term was included.79 Thus the sophistication of the consumer and the
existence of a competitive market do not detract from the need to protect
the consumer against unfair terms which are unduly onerous in the
particular context taking into account factors such as insurability,
reciprocity, and the interests of the business sought to be protected by the
term. Even if other firms have a fairer standard term tucked away in its
long list of terms, the normal consumer cannot realistically be expected to
read and understand all the standard terms on offer and choose on this
basis, and so the mere existence of alternatives on better standard terms
should not penalise a consumer complaining about a substantively unfair
term.80 Instead, the fact that other firms do not include a clause should
perhaps sometimes count in favour of the consumer: this fact may suggest
that the term is not essential for profitability of businesses in that sector
or that opinion in that business sector regards the term as unreasonable
or unethical.81
Of course, procedural aspects may always still be relevant in a
particular case, as I have said. Control over unfair terms would, however,
be less effective if courts do not fully grasp that any reason which
typically and understandably cause customers not to bargain justifies
intervention in appropriate cases. One could perhaps go so far as to say
that the mere fact that the user uses a long list of non-negotiated terms
already causes some ‘‘procedural unfairness’’, because this habit prevents
the typical consumer from reading and comparing terms.
If the DTI cannot be persuaded to change their list of factors in the
way suggested, courts should recognise the legitimacy of finding in an
appropriate case that ‘‘all the circumstances of the case’’ show that the
clause in question is unfair in substance, despite ‘‘economic equality in
bargaining power’’ and alternatives available to the consumer. They
would also benefit from considering the UK Law Commissions’
explanations on the ‘‘bargaining strength’’ and ‘‘knowledge’’ factors.
Such control on the basis of substantive unfairness alone should not
only be used in more ‘‘abstract’’, ‘‘preventative’’ proceedings brought, for
example, by a consumer association or the National Consumer
Commission when they allege that a term or terms used by a particular
79 UK Law Commissions Consultation Paper 15.
80 Cf Griggs 2005 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 1 16-17; Vickers 2004 125 Proceedings of the
British Academy 302.
81 Cf Rebmann et al Mu¨nchener Kommentar } 307 Rn 34 according to whom German law takes into
account the opinions in the particular sector (Anschauungen der Verkehrskreise).
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firm or firms is always unfair. Substantive unfairness control should also
be a possibility where a particular plaintiff as a consumer lodges a
complaint or sues a firm with reference to the particular contract he has
made, or raises the issue of an unfair term when he is sued by the firm
involved.
It is interesting to note that in Germany, particularly before
implementation of the EC Unfair Terms Directive, courts have tended
to use a generalising or abstract approach overtly focused on substantive
fairness, which goes further than the approach advocated here.82 Under
their so-called ‘‘supra-individual generalising approach’’,83 the courts
generally focused on the substantive unfairness of clauses in the light of
typical party interests and not on the particular circumstances of the
particular consumer or business who complained. Writers who consider
this approach of German law point out that there are some advantages to
such overt ‘‘clause-oriented’’ control.84 Some writers have pointed out
that it ‘‘facilitates universal application of the resulting control’’.85 In
other words, it creates a clearer precedent for other firms with respect to
particular types of terms, as it is not primarily concerned with the
particular circumstances of the particular consumer complaining about
the term. Such a clause-oriented approach is said to lead more quickly to
generalised Fallgruppenbildung, which is the emergence of categories of
cases with reference to types of terms, often more closely defined with
regards to particular types of sectors.86 Bernitz87 is of the opinion that, by
contrast, the individualised approach followed thus far in Swedish courts
(focusing on all the circumstances of the particular consumer in every
case) has resulted in ‘‘inadequate foreseeability and probably a certain
lack of efficacy’’ in this area.
However, what I am advocating for cases where a particular consumer
is involved is not what German courts have been doing. Instead, I
advocate an approach to such litigation which is concrete in the sense
that it takes into account the particular interests of the parties and the
particular circumstances of the case, but which is not overly obsessed
82 Maxeiner 2003 Yale Journal of International Law 109 160; Micklitz German Unfair Contract Terms Act
181-182; Howells & Wilhelmsson EC Consumer Law (1997) 100; Rebmann et al Mu¨nchener
Kommentar } 310 Rn 20, 70-75, } 307 Rn 35; Niglia The Transformation of Contract in Europe (2003)
166 et seq. In response to the Directive, } 310(3) was inserted, which enjoins courts to take into account
also the circumstances surrounding conclusion of the contract in the case of consumer contracts (that
is, a contract with a natural person acting outside the scope of his business, trade or profession). In
respect of unfair contract terms control over commercial contracts, the abstract, generalising approach
is still used (Rebmann et al Mu¨nchener Kommentar } 307 Rn 35).
83 U¨berindividuell generalisierende Betrachtung (Rebmann et alMu¨nchener Kommentar } 310 Rn 20; BGH
NJW 1992, 2626).
84 The terminology is that of Bernitz European Law in Sweden Its Implementation and Role in Market
and Consumer Law (2002).
85 Maxeiner 2003 Yale Journal of International Law 109 172.
86 Bernitz Swedish Standard Contracts Law and the EEC Directive on Contract Terms in Lonbay (ed)
Enhancing the Legal Position of the European Consumer (1996) 188. On Fallgruppen generally, see
Beater ‘‘Generalklauseln und Fallgruppen’’ 1992 Archiv des Civilistische Praxis 82.
87 Swedish Standard Contracts Law 188. Cf Whitford ‘‘Contract Law and the Control of Standardised
Terms in Consumer Contracts: An American Report’’ 1995 European Review of Private Law 193 204.
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with procedural factors and recognises that the control of substantive
unfairness on its own is also legitimate in appropriate cases. In particular,
it takes into account the realities of standard form contracting when
considering procedural factors.
2 4 The role of procedural measures
‘‘Procedural’’ measures aimed at improving the conduct of the
‘‘potential bargaining process’’, such as ensuring greater transparency
through requirements on legibility and simple, clear language,88 are very
important.89 Consumers who do have the time to read standard terms,
bargain and shop around would particularly be empowered by these
measures, and more likely to bargain successfully to the ultimate
advantage of less ideal consumers. Such measures may also drive
businesses to use fairer terms, given that consumers (and the businesses
themselves!) may be more likely to read and understand the standard
terms than before. If terms are written in simple language instead of in
incomprehensible, complex legalese, a small business may perhaps realise
that the contract drafted by its lawyers or copied from elsewhere exceeds
its requirements and that it does not wish to be associated with a
particular term. Addressing the ‘‘information asymmetry’’ between
business and consumer may sometimes also lead to a more effective
allocation of risk: a consumer who knows of and understands an
exemption clause well in advance may take out insurance against it or
consciously decide to run a particular risk in order to obtain a product at
a lower cost.90 Such ‘‘procedural’’ measures will, however, be insufficient
in the absence of effective, independent content control.91 Lack of
available information is not the only problem, but rather the inability of
many consumers to benefit from that information before contracting,
whether because of lack of understanding of complex information (such
as the likelihood of risks materialising and the probable costs involved if
they do), lack of time or lack of bargaining skill and power generally.92
‘‘[M]erely knowing of a term does not necessary lead to rational decision-
making by a consumer.’’93
The reality that even clear and legible terms pointed out to the
customer may be unfairly sprung upon him at the very last moment, also
88 The DTI’s draft Bill contains a plain language requirement.
89 Other techniques may concern a requirement that a copy always be given to the other party and be
shown at the user’s place of business, and that incorporation by reference be prohibited (see, eg,
Hondius Standaardvoorwaarden 577).
90 Howells & Weatherill Consumer Protection Law 40.
91 Weatherill EU Consumer Law and Policy 2 ed (2005) 113; Aronstam Consumer Protection 46.
92 Griggs 2005 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 1 21; Aronstam Consumer Protection 46. See also
Beale Legislative Control of Fairness 248 who gives the example of the consumer’s inability to assess
risk (such as the chances of a fairground car leaving the tracks) as impacting upon her understanding
of the exemption clause. See also Vickers 2004 125 Proceedings of the British Academy 125 287 302.
93 Griggs 2005 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 1 51.
UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS LEGISLATION 377
underlines the need for substantive control. It is probably not enough for
unfair terms legislation to merely promote ‘‘informed consumers’’.94
Legislation in many countries, including South Africa, provides for
mandatory terms in certain contracts, which therefore acknowledges that
some terms (exemption clauses in conflict with these mandatory terms)
are too dangerous even for consumers who know of a particular term.
In fact, legislative incorporation control such as requiring the existence
of all exemption clauses to be drawn to the attention of the consumer and
requiring that they be signed or initialled,95 can be a double-edged sword,
if the importance of controlling substantive unfairness as a problem in
itself is not sufficiently realised. Such incorporation measures may
strengthen the hand of the user of a term to argue that a term is fair,
because the consumer has specifically assented to the term.96 Particularly
worrying in this regard is the provision in the DTI’s draft Bill that an
exemption or similar clause in respect of any activity or facility that is
subject to a hazard that could result in serious injury or death is of no
effect unless the hazard has been drawn to the attention of the consumer
and the consumer has signed or initialled that provision indicating
acceptance of it, or otherwise acted in a manner consistent with
acceptance of the provision.97 In my view, any exemption clause which
excludes or limits liability for death or personal injury caused by
negligence should at the very least be presumed to be usually unfair
(‘‘suspect-listed’’ or ‘‘grey-listed’’).98 In any event, courts and adminis-
trative bodies should remember that, despite apparent express agreement
to an exemption clause, a term can still be unfair because it may be
inherently repugnant. This should be sufficient to show that the
consumer suffered from lack of understanding and experience and/or
lack of bargaining power.99 In other words, gross substantive unfairness
in standard terms most often indicates that there must have been
procedural unfairness.
94 See on the concept of the ‘‘informed consumer’’ and the ‘‘confident consumer’’, Weatherill ‘‘Prospects
for the Development of European Private Law through Europeanization in the European Court
The Case of the Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts’’ 1995 European Review of Private
Law 307. See on the insufficiency of the ‘‘informed consumer’’ paradigm, Griggs 2005 Competition and
Consumer Law Journal 1 21.
95 See s 50 of the DTI’s proposal which requires this in the case of exemption and indemnification
clauses.
96 Hondius Standaardvoorwaarden 577; cf Hillman 2006 Michigan Law Review 837 840 854; Whitford
1995 European Review of Private Law 193 206.
97 S 50.
98 See par 3 3 infra on these legislative techniques.
99 Cf Griggs 2005 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 1 21. The unsophisticated consumer may not
realise that it is possible for the business to contract without the term, and may not know that this is
what background law provides.
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3 The limits of judicial control and their implications, particularly
for the substantive provisions of unfair terms legislation
3 1 The insufficiency of common law grounds for intervention
It should now be accepted that the common law grounds for control of
the phenomenon of unfair terms are clearly insufficient.100 In other
words, the combined common law rules on incorporation, interpretation,
voidable contracts and legality (the latter being the most promising) are
of too limited scope to address the problem adequately. I will not repeat
the arguments of the writers or those of the Law Commission who hold
this view here, except to say that it is probably quite understandable that
judges would typically only intervene on the basis of illegality in the
clearest of cases in the absence of explicit legislative sanction to do more.
The Scottish writer, Hector MacQueen, writing after the Afrox case, has
stated that he has sympathy with this attitude of South African judges as
the control of exclusion clauses is ‘‘peculiarly apt for legislative rather
than judicial innovation.’’101 This has been the experience in other
jurisdictions as well.102
3 2 The inherent limits of judicial control
In any event, regardless of how radically a court may interpret its
power to review unfair contract terms on a general basis, judicial control
also has inherent limits. The reasons why judicial control is too limited
not only points to the obvious truth that an administrative body should
be empowered to deal with complaints from consumers, negotiate with
and apply for injunctions against businesses (what I would call the
enforcement parts of the legislation).103 I will not deal any further with
this, particularly as the Law Commission’s proposal on an Ombudsper-
son was very admirable, and the DTI’s new proposed powers for the
National Consumer Commission and the National Consumer Tribunal
do provide the possibility of preventive and reactive control by
administrative bodies.
I will rather concentrate on the implications of the limits of judicial
control for the substantive parts of ideal unfair terms legislation, namely
those which describe or flesh out the concept of unfairness.
The reasons why judicial control is too limited are the following:104
100 See already Aronstam Consumer Protection as well as the South African Law Commission’s Report.
101 MacQueen Good Faith in MacQueen & Zimmermann (eds) European Contract Law: Scots and South
African Perspectives (2006) 43 64.
102 See, eg, Maxeiner 2003 Yale Journal of International Law 109 144.
103 This is what Van der Walt 1993 THRHR 65 70 calls second generation control mechanisms.
104 See especially Hondius Standaardvoorwaarden 488.
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. Access to courts is limited.105 The effort, costs and risks of litigation,
especially when compared with the small sums typically involved in
consumer transactions, promotes an attitude of rather writing off the
episode as a learning experience, with the business continuing its
practice with impunity.106 Lack of knowledge about the law,
particularly in a country with many vulnerable consumers, will also
decrease the likelihood of cases on unfair terms coming to the
courts.107 Perhaps consumers, who may not have heard about the
consumer protection legislation, may not even always complain to
consumer organisations or the National Consumer Commission. If
judicial control is the only control paradigm, a business who suspects
its terms may be declared unfair may rather prefer to settle an
individual case with a particularly difficult consumer on the basis of
waiver of its term, leaving the business free to use that term in all other
contracts.
. Court decisions have a limited effect.108 They only bind the particular
business(es) involved, and may be limited to the particular circum-
stances of the case. Because many cases in respect of B2C contracts will
only reach the lower courts, whose decisions are unreported, other
businesses are unlikely to take note in any event, even with legal
advice.109
. Judicial control is reactive and comes too late, after the abuse has
already taken place, often for years.110
. For some of these reasons combined, it will often be very difficult to
predict with any certainty whether or not a court will provide relief in a
particular case.111 German judge-made law before promulgation of the
Standard Terms Act was criticised for an ‘‘absence of concrete
provisions and for uneven application by lower courts’’.112
105 Hondius Standaardvoorwaarden 488.
106 Hondius Standaardvoorwaarden 488; Aronstam Consumer Protection 46; Griggs 2005 Competition and
Consumer Law Journal 1 23; Maxeiner 2003 Yale Journal of International Law 109 144; Rebmann et al
Mu¨nchener Kommentar Vorbemerkung zum } 305 Rn 10-11; Van der Walt 1993 THRHR 65 75.
107 Rebmann et al Mu¨nchener Kommentar Vorbemerkung zum } 305 Rn 10.
108 Hondius Standaardvoorwaarden 488; Maxeiner 2003 Yale Journal of International Law 109 144;
Rebmann et alMu¨nchener Kommentar Vorbemerkung zum } 305 Rn 11; Van der Walt 1993 THRHR
65 75.
109 S 109 of the DTI’s draft Bill provides that the National Consumer Commission is responsible for
promoting public awareness of consumer protection matters, including publishing any orders and
findings of the Tribunal or a court in respect of a breach of the Act. It is, however, rather unlikely that
the National Consumer Commission will be able to publish every decision by every lower court in the
country involving every breach of every provision of the entire Act. However, they should at least
publish cases on unfair terms in which they themselves were involved, and cases before the Tribunal
as well as details on undertakings given by businesses as a result of negotiations which did not
eventually go to court (as the Law Commission provided for in its Bill).
110 Hondius Standaardvoorwaarden 488.
111 Cf Aronstam Consumer Protection 46 and generally chapter 2.
112 Maxeiner 2003 Yale Journal of International Law 109 144. Judicial control in Germany dates back to
the first half of the 20th century and was based on s 138 of the Civil Code (BGB) which rendered
contracts violating good morals void, and on the requirement of good faith in s 242.
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3 3 The implications for the substantive portions of unfair terms
legislation
The first, obvious conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that
statutory intervention is required. As I have said, this has been accepted
worldwide, including in South Africa.
It is important to note that legislation is more proactive, could lead to
greater predictability if properly structured and has wider effect.113 Thus
the shortcomings of judicial control also emphasise the desirable
outcomes of legislation.
There is clearly a need for a legislative paradigm of preventive or
proactive and not only reactive control. Ideally, this should also permeate
the substantive portions of the legislation, even more so as some of these
limitations apply to action taken by administrative bodies as well, as I
have already suggested. For example, action by the National Consumer
Commission against a particular business would not automatically bind
all other businesses that use similar terms (that may be unfair towards
businesses which had no chance to make representations at the hearing or
negotiations).
One practical way in which the effectiveness of legislative control can
be increased is to formulate the description of what is unfair in as detailed
a manner as possible (without sacrificing the necessary flexibility supplied
by broad provisions at all).114 Lists of prohibited and suspect terms hold
particular promise in this regard. (These are commonly referred to as
‘‘black’’ and ‘‘grey’’ lists elsewhere). Whereas a list of prohibited terms is
a self-explanatory concept, the term ‘‘grey list’’ has been used in different
ways. It refers mostly to a list of terms which would usually be unfair, but
may be justified by the particular circumstances (they are therefore
‘‘suspect’’). Such a grey list is usually clearly described as non-exhaustive
and indicative only, so that application of the general clause could
certainly allow other clauses to be unfair and the listed clauses to be fair
in appropriate circumstances.115
Such detailed provisions increase the likelihood of unfair contract
terms control having a fast, real and proactive effect. They decrease the
need to wait upon courts and administrative authorities to take action.
Businesses would more likely react spontaneously and without court
action to more specific prohibitions in the legislation itself, such as a list
of suspect terms which would usually be unfair, than to a very general
criterion of unfairness which may take a long while to be worked out in
detail on its own.116 In other words, greater particularity in the
substantive provisions increases the chance of self-control.117
113 Maxeiner 2003 Yale Journal of International Law 109 146; Van der Walt 1993 THRHR 65 75.
114 Such as a general clause providing for an open standard such as ‘‘fairness’’ or ‘‘good faith’’.
115 Simpler language than this cryptic description (‘‘non-exhaustive and indicative’’) should be used.
116 Howells Good Faith 98.
117 Van der Walt 1993 THRHR 65 74 79.
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Moreover, it strengthens the hands of the administrative authority
appointed to police unfair contract terms when negotiating with less
conscientious businesses to stop using unfair terms.118 This is likely to
decrease the need for the National Consumer Commission and consumer
organisations to resort to court action.
Another view in support of particularity (that is, a detailed dealing
with issues) is that the clearer the rules, the greater the likelihood of
action being taken against a business, and the more legal actions, the
greater the likelihood of even clearer rules emerging as a result of
litigation.119
Greater particularity also gives greater guidance to lower courts where
cases on unfair terms may be heard, whereas their decisions are not
reported.120
With good reason, lists of terms have therefore been described by
leading international writers in this field as ‘‘of crucial importance’’121
and ‘‘the key element of any attempt to regulate unfair terms’’.122 It has
also been argued that one of the reasons why unfair terms control has
been more effective in Germany than in the USA, is that the US judges
struggled with applying a single general clause, whereas German law
‘‘provided additional authoritative points for application of unfair terms
control [such as lists of prohibited terms], while maintaining a general
clause to respond to the need for flexibility’’.123
Of course, increased particularity in the legislation itself increases
predictability, which is also fair to businesses. This also benefits
consumers and consumer organisations in acting against businesses. It
goes a little way towards addressing the typical complaint that unfair
contract terms legislation creates ambiguity and uncertainty and triggers
wasteful litigation.124 Unfair terms legislation should strike a balance
between the interests of consumers and that of businesses, and this
implies an optimum balance between fairness or flexibility and legal
certainty.125
Accordingly, the South African Law Commission correctly rejected the
Working Committee’s very general, short and non-detailed Bill in 1998.
The latter simply proposed a wide power for courts to strike out unfair
contract terms, with practically no guidance as to when a term would be
118 Cf Van der Walt 1993 THRHR 65 74 79 in respect of ‘‘guidelines’’.
119 Hondius Standaardvoorwaarden 489.
120 See, however, n 109 supra.
121 Hondius Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (1987) 183.
122 De Nova ‘‘Italian Contract Law and the European Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts’’ 1995 European Review of Private Law 221 230.
123 Maxeiner 2003 Yale Journal of International Law 109 172. See also Whitford 1995 European Review of
Private Law 193 200-201. Cf also Hondius Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 173 178 in respect of
practical experience in Denmark and France, both of which had no list at the time of writing (1987).
124 Ko¨tz 1986 SALJ 405 406.
125 UK Law Commissions Consultation Paper 15.
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regarded as unfair.126 The Law Commission’s reaction was to include,
inter alia, a very good and detailed chapter on preventive powers for an
ombudsperson as well as a list of 26 guidelines to be taken into account
when assessing ‘‘unreasonableness, oppressiveness or unconscionability’’.
However, they included neither a prohibited list nor a suspect list as the
latter is commonly understood.127 The DTI’s proposed legislation
contains a prohibited list, but no suspect list of any kind, and the
prohibited list could probably have been used more effectively.128
It should thus be clear that the limitations of judicial control in the
light of obvious goals that the legislation should seek to attain, has a
bearing on the choice of particularity of the substantive provisions.
No prohibited or suspect list in the initial legislation will, however, be
able to exhaustively capture the terms which are likely to be unfair.
Extra-legislative strategies should also be used to provide more detailed
guidance to businesses and consumers as to which terms would likely be
unfair. The National Consumer Commission is therefore urged to follow
the example of the UK Office of Fair Trading (OFT) to publish (non-
binding) guidelines on terms which it considers to be unfair, on the basis
of its experience with negotiation and enforcement.129 The OFT
guidelines draw on the individual case reports published by the OFT in
its regular unfair contract terms bulletins. Apart from its general
guidelines on unfair terms, which includes examples, the OFT publishes
guidelines on unfair terms in specific sectors, such as the package holiday,
health and fitness club and consumer entertainment sectors. These are
available on the OFT website. Such ‘‘extra-legislative’’ particularity is
also important for effective preventive and reactive control and
predictability. It appears, however, that the existence of a suspect list in
the UK legislation itself130 is an important justification relied upon by the
126 Full argument on the reasons for the Working Committee’s aversion to any guidelines is beyond the
scope of this article and was in any event sufficiently addressed in the Law Commission’s final report.
The main problem with the Committee’s arguments is that they focused exclusively on a paradigm of
judicial control, eg, by arguing that courts may restrict control to the situations envisaged in the
guidelines. As argued above, self-control and preventive control which is more proactive and effective
than ex post facto judicial control benefits from the use of guidelines and lists. See, eg, Van der Walt
1993 THRHR 65 74. The Working Committee was opposed to any system of preventive control by an
administrative body.
127 The non-exhaustive list of 26 guidelines contains rather detailed ‘‘factors’’, reminiscent of a suspect list,
mixed with more general ‘‘factors’’ or ‘‘guidelines’’ such as the relative bargaining positions of the
parties, commonly accepted standards of fair dealing, the alternatives available to the party prejudiced
by the term, reciprocity andwhether negotiation took place. The guidelines towards the latter part of s 2
which remind one of a suspect list include, eg, the consideration ‘‘whether a term provides that a party
against whom the term is proffered shall in any circumstances absolutely and unconditionally forfeit his
or her competence to demand performance’’ and ‘‘whether the party proffering the term is made the
judge of the soundness of his or her own performance, or whether the party against whom the term is
proffered is compelled to sue a third party first before he will be able to act against the party proffering
the term’’. Although the Law Commission listed some examples of prohibited and suspect lists in its
comparative overview, it never discussed this technique in its evaluative comments.
128 Full argument on this matter cannot be attempted here.
129 Only the courts can give a final ruling on what is definitely unfair.
130 The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. The UK Law Commissions propose a
revision of this grey list in their Draft Bill.
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OFT in this regard. The listing of particular terms as probably unfair in a
set of guidelines is often justified as non-binding interpretations of the
suspect list, insofar as a court had not specifically decided on a term
mentioned in the guidelines.131
4 Conclusion
There can be no doubt that South Africa needs unfair contract terms
legislation, particularly in the light of the inherent limits of judicial
control.
In formulating and applying unfair terms legislation, one should realise
that the main reason why the customer has no real chance of influencing
preformulated, non-negotiated terms, is the ‘‘prohibitively high transac-
tion costs involved [in reading, bargaining over and shopping around for
non-negotiated terms], rather than the superiority of the entrepre-
neur’’.132 This reality in itself justifies intervention, as it causes reasonable
people confronted with non-negotiated terms to typically refrain from
properly evaluating all the consequences of the transaction, with the
result that the transaction cannot be regarded as the outcome of the self-
determination of both parties.133 Thus party autonomy does not provide
a justification for the enforcement of all such terms.
One conclusion to be drawn from this analysis of the problem is that
content control on the basis of substantive unfairness alone is justified in
some cases. The proposed South African consumer protection legislation
should reconsider the list of factors to be considered in applying the
‘‘unfairness’’ standard. It should include factors to do with substantive
fairness as well and should formulate the procedural factors to do with
the manner in which agreement was reached in a manner more sensitive
to the realities of standard form contracting. The UK Law Commission’s
proposed Unfair Contract Terms Bill is particularly helpful in this regard.
One reason why it should be considered is that the DTI’s list of factors
was ultimately inspired by the 1977 UK Unfair Contract Terms Act,
which the UK Law Commission considered could be improved in this
regard.
In any event, courts should be aware of the justification for overt
content control on the basis of substantive unfairness alone, and be
willing to downplay such procedural factors in an appropriate case.
Incorporation control over exemption clauses such as the proposed
countersigning of exemption clauses in the draft Bill is helpful to limit
abuse, but can be a double-edged sword which may ultimately work
against consumers if it is not coupled with an understanding of the typical
realities surrounding the conclusion of a consumer contract. It is
131 See, eg, the Unfair Contract Terms Guidance of February 2001 par A, and the Guidance on Unfair
Terms in Consumer Entertainment Contracts (2003) 15.
132 Zweigert & Ko¨tz Comparative Law 335.
133 See the quotations from Zimmermann to this effect at n 36 supra.
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particularly dangerous to specifically mention counter-signing of exemp-
tion clauses in connection with death and personal injury in this regard,
given that the proposed legislation does not prohibit or suspect-list
exclusion or limitation of liability for negligence causing death or
personal injury.
An appreciation of the reasons why judicial control is inherently
limited leads to a better understanding of the desirable outcomes of
unfair terms legislation. The desirability of a preventive, and not only a
reactive, approach has implications not only for the procedural or
enforcement parts of such legislation, but also for the substantive
provisions which attempt to flesh out the concept of ‘‘unfairness’’. In
particular, particularity supplied by the use of non-exhaustive lists of
prohibited and suspect terms, has an important role to play to promote
fast and effective preventive and reactive control. The greater predict-
ability which they bring is also advantageous for everyone involved.
These mechanisms are not sufficiently utilised in the DTI’s current
proposals and an in-depth comparative study thereof is justified.
OPSOMMING
’n Behoorlike begrip van die redes waarom statuteˆre beheer oor onbillike kontraksterme
noodsaaklik is het etlike implikasies vir die wenslike inhoud en toepassing van sulke wetgewing.
Die belangrikste rede waarom die verbruiker gewoonlik geen invloed op die inhoud van
standaardkontraksterme het nie, is die hoe¨ transaksiekoste verbonde aan die lees en
onderhandeling van sodanige terme. Dit lei dikwels daartoe dat die standaardterme van ’n
verbruikerskontrak nie as die selfbeskikking van een van die partye tot die kontrak beskou kan
word nie (en dus van sy outonomie of kontrakteervryheid nie). Een gevolgtrekking is dat
inhoudelike kontrole geregverdigd is, ook op grond van substantiewe onbillikheid alleen in
gepaste gevalle. Dit is dus problematies dat die Suid-Afrikaanse Departement van Handel en
Nywerheid in hul konsep-verbruikerswetgewing slegs prosedurele faktore in die lys van faktore
noem wat in besonder in ag geneem moet word by beoordeling van kontraksterme vir
onbillikheid, behalwe vir die vraag of die goedere gemaak is op spesiale aanvraag van die koper
(wat nie dikwels relevant sal wees nie). Voorstelle vir verbetering van hierdie lys word dus gemaak.
Daar word ook gepleit vir ’n genuanseerde begrip en toepassing van prosedurele faktore wat die
realiteite van standaardvorm-kontraktering in ag neem. Die redes waarom regterlike kontrole te
beperk is, lei tot ’n beter begrip van die wenslike uitkomste van onbillike kontraksterme-
wetgewing. Die belangrikheid van voorkomende beheer het ook implikasies vir die substantiewe
bepalings van sodanige wetgewing. Gedetailleerdheid voorsien deur lyste van verbode en verdagte
terme (‘‘swart’’ en ‘‘grys’’ lyste) kan veral in vinnige, effektiewe voorkomende en reaktiewe beheer
’n belangrike rol speel.
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